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THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF COMMODITY STORAGE 
Brian D. Wright and Jeffrey C. Williams 
Yale University 
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a model of competitive, profit-maximizing storage 
of a commodity with economically responsive, although stochastic, supply. 
By comparing the distributions of market variables with and without storage, 
we show that several intuitive notions about the role of storage are 
misleading. Rather than stabilizing production, storage actually accen-
tuates its variability. Rather than being most effective at eliminating 
short-falls in consumption, storage is more effective at reducing the incidence 
of exceedingly high consumption. Even so, a welfare analysis shows storage 
is favorable to consumers over a wide range of demand specifications and 
supply elasticities. 
THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF COMMODITY STORAGE 
Brian D. Wright and Jeffrey C. Williams 
Yale University 
One of the earliest, and most successful, examples of 
economic policy is the oft-quoted Biblical account of Joseph's interpre­
tation of the Pharoah's dream as implying that seven years of abundant 
harvests would precede seven years of drought, and Joseph's recommendation 
that the Pharoah should accumulate grain during the good years. Since 
that time the central role of storage in stabilizing the economy in the 
face of exogenous disturbances has been obvious, but our understanding of 
the nature of that role has not greatly advanced. 
Without divine assistance in forecasting stochastic production, the 
storage decision is considerably more complex than the one Joseph faced, 
and the role of storage quite different. In fact, several commonly held 
impressions about the role of storage of commodities such as grains are 
incorrect. Rather than stabilizing production, storage actually accentuates 
its variability. Rather than causing a mean-price-preserving decrease or a 
mean-output-preserving decrease in the dispersion of price, storage generally 
complex modification of the distribution of price. Rather thancauses a more 
being most effective at eliminating short-falls in consumption, storage 
actually is more effective at eliminating the incidence of exceedingly high 
consumption. 
In this paper we explore the role of storage in a model where produc­
tion is stochastic and both production and storage are performed by competitive 
profit-maximizers who form rational expectations about the returns to their 
2 
activities. We derive the subtle but very important interactions among· 
production, price expectations, and storage, which simpler models cannot 
capture. Finally, we make a comparative statics assessment of the distri­
butional implications of storage. These results, while confirming the 
importance of the specification of the demand function and the supply 
elasticity identified in recent analytical studies (e.g. Wright (1979) and 
Newbery and Stiglitz (1979)), are surprisingly favorable to consumers, 
considering the asymmetric nature of the effects of storage on consumption 
and price. 
We start with a-closed competitive economy, in which all consumers are 
assumed to be identical. The inverse consumption demand for the single commo­
dity in question is 
(1) 
where Pt is the price at time t and qt is the quantity consumed. 
(2) 
where St is the amount stored to period t + 1, and It is the amount on hand, 
(3) I as 
t t-1 
uhere x is production in period t and a is the proportion of S availablet t-1 
at time t, after "shrinkage" or wastage of (1 - a)St_ •1 
Production in each period is subuect to a random disturbance. Common 
sources of production instability are likely to have multiplicative effects 
on output, rather than the additive effects assumed in much of the literature 
on storage and market stabilization. In grain production for example, because 
weather determines the yield of a particular acre, the more acres planted the 
3 
greater will be the variation in total output. Accordingly, the supply function is 
(4) + V ]t 
where vt is the random production disturbance with a probability distribution 
f(v) of finite variance. The disturbance is assumed to be serially uncorre-
1 r
lated and is the same for each producer. Pt is the producer incentive at 
,. r 
time t - 1, when planned production, x (Pt), must be selected for time t. 
Under this specification short-run (same period) production is perfectly 
inelastic. 
We assume that producers and all others in the model maximize profits 
and have rational expections in the Muthian sense. Both the structure of the 
model and the distribution of vt are in the common information set nt-l 
in period t-1. Revenue of producer i when his realized production is x.1.t 
is 
= 
The producer maximizes expected profits 
,. 
(6) 
where His total cost and E denotes the conditional expectation given r2 • t-1 
Under atomistic competition, each producer is a price-taker, but he recognizes 
the perfect correlation between the disturoance in his own production and 
the disturbance in aggregate production. Hence the first order condition for 
competitive profit maximization is 
(7) oE[II. ]




Thus a producer's incentive is the marginal return per unit of planned 
r
production, Pt' where (remembering that he is a price-taker), 
(8) 
= 
1 .. The Competitive Profit-Haximizing Storage Rule 
To complete the market model, we must consider the cost of storage, 
which can be viewed as a productive activity transferring units of the 
commodity available in period t to units available in period t + 1. 
The cost of storing St units in period tis 
(9) = 
where ~(St) is the net cost of physical storage services, (1 - a) is the 
shrinkage factor, that is, the physical depreciation of the stored commodity, 
and r is the interest rate. Both a and rare, for simplicity, assmned 
constant over time, with r > 0 and O < a< 1. All prices and costs 
are expressed in real terms. For commodities such as grains, empirical 
evidence indicates that marginal physical storage costs are fairly constant 
over the relevant range (Paul 1970). Ac.cordingly, we specify physical 
storage costs in (9) as 
(10) k > 0 
5 
Empirical research on the "price of storage" relating grain stocks at 
the end of the crop year to the difference between the nearest futures price 
and the spot price shows that the net cost of storage includes an offsetting 
accessibility value or "convenience yieldu to users which makes the net 
marginal cost of storage negative at low levels of S. (See Working (1949), 
Brennan (1958), or Telser (1958).) This accessibility value, which is related 
to stochastic elements in distribution and demand, is discussed elsewhere at 
length by one of the authors (Williams 1980). Here we assume away any 
accessibility value of stocks, and focus on the role of storage in mitigating 
2 
the effects of aggregate production disturbances. 
Private storage, like production, is assumed to be a competitive_ profit­
maximizing activity. Given current inventory i , and conditional on storage
0 
of ST in some future year T, the optimal storage in the current period is 
the solution to a stochastic dynamic programming problem, in the tradition of 
Gustafson (1958a and b). (See also Johnson and Summer (1976), Newbery and 
Stiglitz (forthcoming).) As Samuelson (1971) shows, given an individualistic 
social welfare function and appropriate regularity and transversality 
cond · · are-maximizing· · orage, s* und . t economyitions,3 welf · s t t' in· an is t ored 
with infinite horizon is a function of the amount available, 
(11) 0 -s f' < 1 
and the Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions are 
-1
(12) 0 < (1 + r) a EPt+l - (Pt+ k) 
0 = 
6 
These conditions can be reinterpreted as the following competitive profit­
maximizing arbitrage condition: Profit-maximizing competitive storage, if 
positive, will equate current period price with expected price in the next 
period, less the marginal cost of storage services, skrinkage, and interest 
on capital invested. 
The non-negativity of storage means that there is a fundamental 
discontinuity in the storage rule. Although it is possible to store for 
the future, it is physically impossible to borrow from the future. This 
asymmetry has crucial implications for the effect of storage on consumption and 
price. 4 
2. The Effects of Storage on Market Demand 
The rule for profit-maximizing storage depends upon the particular 
specifications of supply and consumption demand, as well as on the degree 
of shrinkage, the cost of storage services, and the interest rate. To allow for 
examination of a wide range of specifications of the consumption demand func­
tion, the following general form is used: 
Bq1-C(13) p = a + , a > 0 
This form includes the linear (a> O, C = O, 6 ~ O) and constant 
elasticity (a = O, B > O, C > 1) as special cases. In what follows, 
the relative curvature of a given demand curve is measured by C, which is 
the Pratt-Arrow measure of curvature used to assess-relative risk aversion: 
9P" (g)(14) C 
p I (q) 
7 
If C is greater than 2.0, the demand curve displays "commodity risk aversion", 
because consumers would nay for a mean-preservinR decreaRe of the dispersion in 
price. If C is less than 2.0, the demand curve has commodity risk preference. 
Derivation of the optimal storage rule in this model is analy­
tically intractible. Fortunately profit-maximizing storage rules 
can be derived numerically using a process of successive approximation 
described in the Appendix. The storage function illustrated in Figure 1 
was derived using this numerical method. It represents the case where the 
5
elasticity of demand nD is -0.2, the elasticity of supply n is 0, the 
interest rate is 0.05, and supply in the absence of ·the stochastic 
disturbance (i.e. at v = 0) is 100. The distribution of the multiplicative
t 
disturbance is a normal density function with a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of 0.05. Physical storage costs are set at zero, and skrinkage is 
assumed to be zero. Notice that when a quantity less than an amount I (equal to 
99.09 in this example) is on hand, from current output and previous storage, 
all of the available commodity is consumed. Any excess above I is divided 
between current consumption and storage. The marginal propensity to store 
chan8es only slowly over a large range of I, for I> -I. This is characteristic 
5
of the storage functions derived for a wide range of sets of parameters. 
In the example behind the storage function illustrated, because mean production and 
consumption are 100, and mean storage is 3.4, mean availability is close to 103.4. 
Under profit-maximizing storage, current price can be expressed as 
function of the amount in store. Using equation (1), the inverse consumption 
demand function, and equations (2) and (11), 
(15) = 
8 
This expression is the inverse demand function for storage. More precisely, 
it is the inverse derived demand for the input of the commodity into the 
storage process; accordingly, it is a function of the costs of the other 
inputs into that process, including the costs of shrinkage, storage 
services, and capital. The derived demand for storage corresponding to the 
stnrape function in Fi~ure 1 rnP.etR the _nrice axis at P - = 104.7. Yhen current 
price exceeds P, expected future price net of all storage costs is less than 
current price, so that there is no profit in even the first unit of storage. 
Horizontal addition of the storage demand function to the consumption 
demand function yields the market demand function shown in Figure 2. At price 
P the elasticity of market demand changes from 0.20 to 0.48. This augmentation 
of consumption demand below P by the storage demand function may explain the 
(admittedly tentative) conclusion of Hillman, Johnson, and Gray (1975) that the 
demand curve for corn is highly nonlinear, being much less elastic at high 
prices than at lower prices. Their measurements, relating price changes to 
changes -in availability rather than in consumption, may reflect the demand 
for storage, rather than any nonlinearity in the underlying consumption 
demand curve. This distinction is important, since, as we show below, 
the welfare effects of stabilization are crucially dependent on the curvature 
of the consumption demand curve, not of the market demand curve. The 
failure of Hillman et al. to draw this distinction is shared by several studies 
of price stabilization that quote their conclusion, including Reutlinger (1976) 
and Just et al. (1978). 
3. The Effects of Storage with Zero Supply Elasticity. 
As observed above, a rule·for optimal storage has the property that 
below some level of availability I, no storage is carried over from one pro­
duction period to the next. Above I, consumption and storage generally both 
increase as I increases, and the marginal propensity to store also rises. 
9 
These simple qualities of the storage rule actually have strong 
implications for the effects of storage. To show this, we used the 
example beqind the storage rule illustrated above, with constant elasticity 
S 
of demand n 
D 
= - 0.2 (C = 6), and elasticity of supply n = O.O. Starting 
with nothing in store, we applied the storage rule in a simulation of 10,004 
periods, drawing from the random distribution of the production disturbance, 
and saved all market data beyond the fourth period. (For a sample of this size, 
the distributions of the variables of interest should closely follow, the 
population distributions.) 
The distribution of storage is shown in Figure 3. It is clearly 
24.4% of the time. Meanbi-modal and highly skewed. No storage occurs 
storage is 3.4 and th~ standard deviation is 3.5. (Sample means and standard 
deviations for the distributions discussed in this and the following sections 
are displayed in Table,l.) We also simulated the same number of periods 
zero. A compa­with the identical string of random numbers holding storage at 
rison of these two simulations provides an instructive illustration of the 
effects of storage on market variables. 
3.1 Effects of Storage on Price 
Storage causes a large, asymmetric and possibly counter-intuitive change 
in the distribution of price. The distribution of price in the absence of storage 
is shown in Figure 4. Although the production disturbance is symmetric, the 
distribution of price is not, because of the nonlinearity in the constant 
elasticity demand curve. Figure 5 shows the distribution of price for the 
same production sequence when storage is possible. A comparison of the 
distributions in Figure 4 and Figure 5 indicates that first of all, storage 
lowers the mean price, in this example by 2.4%. Because the mean of the 




decrease in the dispersion of price, in the terminology of Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1970 and 1971). 
To isolate the changes in dispersion from this change in the mean, 
we shifted the distribution in Figure 5 by the difference in the mean price 
and subtracted the densities in Figure 4 from those in Figure 5 to obtain 
Figure 6. With the help of Figure 6, we can see that storage affects price 
dispersion mainly by shifting probability mass from the lower tail towards 
the mean. Thus the effects of storage on the price distribution are asymetric 
in a fashion that contradicts popular notions about storage. We tend to 
think of storage primarily as protection of consumers against commodity 
shortages and high prices. But the type of storage considered here is much 
more dependable in precluding coiliillodity gluts and low prices. The greater 
the inconvenience to consumers of a shortage (reflected in the demand curve) 
the higher will be expected price and the larger the incentive to store. 
Even so, optimal storage will not be large enough to ensure that there will 
never be a shortage. Indeed as Townsend (1977) has shown, any finite store 
will be emptied with probability one in finite time. 
3.2 Effects of Storage on Consumption 
Because the elasticity of supply is zero in this example, storage 
does not affect average consumption. Without storage, consumption has the 
same distribution as production. Under perfectly inelastic supply, storage 
causes a large mean-preserving decrease in the dispersion of consumption. 
In the sample of 10,000 periods, storage reduces the standard deviation 
of consumption from 5.0 to 3.0; by that measure it goes forty percent of 
the distance to complete stabilization. But this decrease in dispersion is 
11 
clearly asymmetric, as the resulting distribution is significantly skewed to 
the left. Figure 7 shows the difference between the frequency of consumption 
with and without storage. 
4. The Implications of Responsive Supply 
4.1 Effects of Storage on Planned Production 
Once storage is introduced in the model, the assumption of perfectly 
inelastic supply becomes a very important restriction. In the absence of 
storage, the elasticity of supply is in fact irrelevant. Because there is no 
serial correlation in the production disturbances, a shortage or glut in one 
r 
season has no effect on price in the next. Hence Pt, the economic incentive 
for production in year t as of year t - 1, when production must be planned, is 
constant from year to year. 
r 
Storage effects the production incentive, Pt, in a given period in two 
ways. First, for a given current output of the commodity, the demand for 
current storage increases price by augmenting the consumer demand curve as 
shown previously in Figure 2. Second, for a given output, any carryover from 
the previous year depresses the realized price. The relative strength of 
these two effects on the incentive to produce varies from period to period, 
r 
so that Pt is sometimes higher, sometimes lower than it would be without 
.storage. 'This interaction of storage and production is quite important to the 
effects of storage, a fact missed by other models in the tradition of Gustafson 
6 
(1958a and b) in which elasticity of supply is fixed at zero. We illustrate 
r
the net result of storage on Pt using the previous example modified so that 
s is constant at 1.0 and supply is linear within the observedsupply elasticity n 
range of planned production. 
12 
Under responsive supply, the marginal propensity to store is greater 
than in the storage rule illustrated in Figure 1 for n 
s 
= O.O, and the level 
of availability at which storage begins, I, is larger. Although storage is 
generally thought of as a market-stabilizing mechanism, it clearly destabilizes 
planned production, as can be seen in the distribution of planned production 
under storage as shown in Figure 8. In fact, the coefficient of variation of 
planned production rises from 0% under completely inelastic supply to 41% of 
that of realized production, which is in turn 10% higher than the coefficient 
of variation of production without storage. It is obvious that the derived 
demands for production inputs (which are not explicitly considered here) are 
also destabilized by storage. Rather than being regarded as a means of 
stabilizing production, competitive storage should be thought of as a way of 
efficiently dispersing the effects of a disturbance thoughout an (undistorted) 
economy. 
In effect, storage acts as a substitute for production. When current 
supplies are abundant and the price of the commodity put into storage is low, 
it is more economical to deliver supplies next period through storage rather 
than through production. On the other hand, if current supplies are expensive, 
production is relatively more attractive. When production is more responsive, 
these two substitutes will each display greater variation, but their combined 
action results in more stable consumption. 
Besides increasing the dispersion of production, storage also 
changes its mean, in this case by -0.4%. The direction of this change 
is related to the curvature of the demand curve, measured by the relative 
commodity risk aversion parameter C. As Table l shows, if the example is 
changed so that C equals O.O, its value when demand is linear, while the 
demand elasticity (at the equilibrium consumption in the nonstochastic case) 
13 
sremains -0.2, storage increases mean planned production when n = 1. For 
demand curves with intermediate values of C, but the same elasticity, the 
direction of change of mean planned production when n s = 1 depends on 
the degree of stabilization of consumption effected by storage, which is 
7
itself a function of the cost of storage. 
The contribution of responsive production to this process, however, 
is asymmetric. Maximum planned production, at 102.3, is the level of planned 
production whenever storage is zero, which occurs in 27.9% of all years. 
Therefore responsive production is poor insurance against a run of particularlv 
bad harvests, since it provides a maximum offsetting increase in expected 
availability of only 2.3%. Production response is much more flexible in 
compensating for abnormally good years; minimum planned production in the 
sample is 9.2% below the mean. This may explain why Gustafson (1958b) indicates 
observed yields per acre of field crops are significantly skewed to the left, 
while Day (1965) concludes yields in controlled experiments are skewed to the 
right if at all. Through its effects on economic incentives, storage may alter 
realized production asymmetrically not only through acres planted but through 
yields. 
4.2 Effects of Responsive Supply on Storage, Price, and Consumption 
Responsive supply greatly accentuates the effects of storage on price 
and consumption, though it scarcely changes the first two moments of the storage 
D
distribution. In the standard example, (n c -0.2, Cc 6) mean storage is higher 
by only 1.3% for n 
s= 1 relative ton=s O, while the standard deviation is virtually 
unaltered. But under the more responsive supply the distribution is much less 
skewed, and the maximum amount in store in the sample is reduced from 24.8 to 
20.3. Reductions in planned production moderate the build-up of storage in a 
string of good years. 
14 
The existence of responsive supply greatly enhances the decrease 
in the price dispersion caused by storage. The coefficient of variation is 
lower by 22.4% compared to the case illustrated in Figure 5. The distribution 
is much more highly skewed and minimum price is more than doubled in this 
sample. 
The dramatic effect of responsive supply on the dispersion of consump-
tion under storage is shown 1·n Fi·gure 9. Th 1 t · ff dbe c us ering e ecte y storage 
is greatly accentuated by a transfer of probability mass from areas both 
above and below the mean, reducing the coefficient of variation by 24%. 
The difference in mean consumption.is negligible, but the new distribution 
is much more skewed and has much higher kurtosis. The most striking 
effect is that maximum consumption in the sample is reduced by 12.5%, even 
though maximum production is actually increased. Maximum consumption is 
in fact only a miniscule 0.35% higher than maximum planned production, which 
occurs whenever storage is zero. 
The effect of responsive supply on maximum consumption can be explained 
as follows. When supply is perfectly inelastic, very high consumption levels 
occur after consecutive years of very high production. When supply is 
elastic, planned produ~tion is reduced after a good year, and profit­
maxirnizinp, storage is increased; the net effact is a lower level of consumption 
in the current year and the next, relative to the situation with fixed long­
run supply. The same kind of compensation does not occur in a string of very 
bad years, however, because below the level of availability at which storage 
is zero, further marginal shortfalls do not increase the price incentive P.
r 
This explains why minimum consumption in the sample is higher by only 0.7% 
under elastic supply, even though maximum consumption is so drastically reduced. 
15 
6. The Relevance of Demand Specification 
Both the slope and curvature of the demand curve affect storage 
behavior. The less steep-is the demand curve, the lower is average storage, 
and the less frequent is the occurrence of storage. For example, line 5 of 
D S 
Table 1 shows that at n = -0.5, C = 6, and n = O, mean storage is 1.12 
D S 
(compared to 3.4 for n = -0.2, C = 6, n = O), storage occurs 49.0% of the time 
(compared to 75.6%) and the standard deviation of consumption is reduced by only 
21% (compared to 40%). Indeed, further examples would show that for demand 
elasticities above unity the effects of storage are ne~ligihle • 
. The effects of demand curvature, measured by C, the degree of "relative 
commodity risk aversion," can be inferred from the cases summarized in Table 1. 
The higher risk aversion at C = 6 is reflected in somewhat higher storage and 
lower variance of consumption. _But the dispersion of prices is greater for 
C = 6, whether or not storage is possible. Although the magnitudes of these 
effects of demand curvature are not very great, the distributional implications 
are very important, as we shall now show. 
7. The Distributional Effects of Storage 
So far we have considered the effects of storage on prices and 
quantities. Many studies of storage consider nothing else. But the 
ultimate interest of the results depicted in the figures and in Table 1 lies 
in their implications for human welfare. There is a large analytical 
literature in the tradition of Waugh (1944), Oi (1964), and Massell (1969) 
which attempts to model the welfare effects of storage as a symmetric reduction 
in the dispersion of the production disturbance, implicitly or explicitly 
assuming away the non-negativity constraint on storage, which, as noted above, 
makes the problem analytically intractable. (See Turnovsky (1978) for a survey 
16 
of this literature on stabilization. More recent work includes Newbery and 
8
Stiglitz (1979) and Wright (1979).) Because storage is much more reliable at 
eliminating gluts than in alleviating shortages, it might seem likely that 
the share of the allocative benefits accruing to consumers might be significantly 
lower than under the symmetric reduction in the dispersion of consumption 
effected by ideal stabilization. Further, from Table 1 one might guess 
that storage favors consumers most when it lowers consumption variance the 
most (line 4), or when it lowers price variance the most (line 2). In fact none 
of these deductions from the information presented thus far is correct. 
To assess the comparative statics distributional implications of storage, 
we measured the mean changes in the present value of producer rents at the 
time of harvest (denoted by the shorthand term "land value") and the mean 
changes in present value of consumer surplus.9 To make these measures meaning-
ful, we expressed them as percentages of a common base, the expected annual 
value of production in a market without storage. This base was preferred to 
land value without storage, because land value is dependent on the specification 
of the entire supply function from zero to maximum production, that is, well 
10beyond the relevant range here. 
The results for eight cases are presented in Table 2. It is immediately 
clear that the distributional effects are heavily dependent on the three para­
meters c, n° , an:! n5• The direction of the effects depend largely on C. Consider 
first the cases where n 
s = 0. Under linear demand (C = 0) in which consumers 
are commodity risk-preferring, storage favors land holders at the expense of 
consumers, but under constant elasticity of demand (C = 6), in which consumers 
are cotm:n0dity risk averse, the reverse is true. In the intermediate case 
(C = 1.95, which approximates the hyperbolic demand specification 
(P =a+ b q-l) in which consumers are commodity risk-neutral, storage has 




= 1, storage always increases the expected welfare of consumers 
in Table 2, even if they are commodity-risk-preferring (C = 0). It is also 
evident that responsive production greatly moderates the distributional 
impact of storage. Therefore, the assumption in most previous studies of 
8
either n = 0 or an "irrational" response (e.g., adaptive expectations) in supply 
may result in misleading distributional inferences. Note also that respon-
sive supply increases the sum of the changes in the expected present value of 
producer and consumer surplus so that, as the adverse distributional effects 
. decline, the increase in net welfare is greater. The case in line 2 of Table 2 
in which the reduction in the standard deviation of price is greatest (see 
Table 1) actually has the greatest net increase in welfa~e (in the comparative 
statics sense), but certainly does not confer the greatest benefit on consumers, 
as intuition might suggest. Two other perhaps counter-intuitive results are 
that the net gains are largest in the case when consumers have commodity risk 
preference, and that the reduction in the variance of consumption is not greatest 
when the net gains are largest. 
Lines 7 and 8 in Table 2 show that storage has much less significance to 
welfare at higher elasticities of demand, in line with the less pronounced 
D 
effects pri ce consumpt i on sown for n -0.5 in Table 1. At theon and h = 
higher elasticity of demand, consumers can more easily substitute other goods 
for the commodity in question during a shortage, so storage is of less 
11importance. 
The second and fourth columns of Table 2 display the differential 
effects of ideal stabilization, that is, the complete absence of the production 
disturbance itself. Even though the storage modeled here has a very low cost 
(an interest rate of 5 percent being the only carrying charge) ideal stabi­
lization has much greater distributional effects and net benefits. Furthermore, 
18 
lines 3 and 4 indicate that the sign of the effect on land value reverses 
at a higher value of C under ideal stabilization than under storage, so that 
over a certain range, ideal stabilization has an effect opposite to that of 
storage. In both storage and ideal stabilization, the distributive effects 
are almost linearly related to c. 
The most noteworthy lesson to be drawn from Table 2 is that the 
asymmetric effects of storage, emphasized in previous sections, do not result 
in a greater share of the allocative benefits accruing to producers. Ralative 
to the net gain, the differential gain to consumers is even greater under 
storage than under ideal stabilization; except in line 1. The explanation lies 
in the incompleteness of the stabilization effected by storage. Small 
symmetric reductions in variance always favor consumers for C > 1, even 
12though larger reductions may favor producers. Given C, the total distri-
butive outcome depends on the extent of storage, which is a function of the 
cost of storage~ the consumer demand elasticity, and the supply elasticity. 
Conclusion 
Competitive storage of commodities that are subject to stochastic 
production disturbances is much more effective in eliminating excessive levels 
of consumption and low prices than in preventing low levels of consumption 
and high prices. This asymmetry stems from the constraint that storage must 
not be negative, and is greatly accentuated when producers, as well as storers, 
respond to incentives with rational expectations. When this is the case, the 
interaction between storage and responsive production is subtle and complex. 
Responsive production generally has relatively little effect on mean storage, 
and vice versa, so in this sense it is not clear whether the two activities 
19 
are substitutes or complements. Yet when combined, they stabilize consumption 
and market price in a highly complementary way, even though storage destabilizes 
planned and realized production. 
The implications of storage for producers and consumers cannot be 
directly inferred from its effects on the distribution of consumption or 
price. A numerical welfare analysis shows that when demand is relatively 
inelastic the storage activity may have substantial effects on the expected 
present value of consumer surplus and of producer surplus, effects that are 
either positive or negative depending on the curvature of the demand curve 
and the supply elasticity. Given the asymmetric effects of storage on 
consumption and price which would seem to favor producers, it is noteworthy 
that the differential gains to consumers who are commodity risk averse are 
more favorable, relative to the net social gain, than they are under the 
symmetric elimination of the disturbance defined as ideal stabilization. 
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APPENDIX 
Solving for the Derived Demand for Storage 
If there is an infinite horizon, the derived demand for storage 
is the same in all periods. Therefore, if a storage rule, St= f(It), 
when applied, reproduces itself, the derived demand curve has been deduced. 
In the computer program, the storage rule is found by using the relation 
between EPt+l and St implicit in the necessary conditions for profit-maximizing 
storage. 
First a guess is made for a polynomial in St that approximates 
Using the storage rule implied by this function 
and the competitive arbitrage conditions, expected price is calculated for a 
range of integer values of s. This calculation requires a determination of 
the particular planned production consistent with that S because the amount 
of production influences expected price. This is accomplished by guessing a 
... 
· planned production x and calculating the various prices that occur with 
particular outcomes of the random probability distribution around that planned 
production. (A discrete approximation to the normal density function is used, 
with 80 possible values spanning four standard deviations each side of the 
mean.) The integer storage under consideration plus these random outcomes of 
production provide a distribution of amounts available. For each of these in 
turn, the current storage rule is used to compute storage and consumption. 
Expected price is calculated from the distribution of consumption osing the 
r 
inverse consumption demand function. The producer incentive price, Pt, is 
calculated along with expected price by weighting the price at particular 
outcomes by the ratio of realized production to planned production. If this 
P~, ~-!hen applied in the supply function, would yield the guess for planned 
A2 
production, x, a consistent set of S, E[Pt+l], and x ha
s been found. 
A 
If not, another guess for xis made. 
Once the calculation of E[Pt+l] has been made for each 
of the integer 
values of St, expected price can be fitted to a polynom
ial in storage by the 
means of a least-quares regression (A fourth-order poly
nomial is used). If 
that polynomial has not changed significantly (as defin
ed by the convergence 
criterion) from the one used to generate the values of 
expected price at 
various levels of storage, a stable storage demand curv
e has been found. If 
not, the most recently fitted polynomial replaces the p
revious guess, and the 
process is repeated. In effect, this procedure continu
es until the incorrect 
initial guess is no longer of any significance. 
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TABLE 1 
EXAMPLES OF THE MARKET EFFECTS OF STORAGE 
Sample Means
a 
Case Production and Production and Price 
Consumption Consumption WithoutD S b 
(C,n ,n ) Without Storage With Storage Storage Price Storage 
1. (0.0,-0.2,0.0) 
C 
100.0 100.0 3.2 100.1 100.1 
2. (0.0,-0.2,1.0) 
C 99.9 99.9 3.2 100.7 101.0 
3. (6.0,-0.2,0.0) d 100.0 100.0 3.4 101.6 104.0 
d
4. (6.0,-0.2,1.0) 100.4 100.0 3.4 100.9 102.0 
5. (6.0,-0.5,0.0) 100.0 100.0 1.1 101.1 101.6 
100.3 100.1 1.4 100.7 100.96• (6.0,-0.5,1.0) 
Sam2le Standard Deviations
a 
Case Production and Price 
Consumption Planned Wtthout 
D
(C, n ! 11s)b Without Storage Production Production Consum2tion Storage Price Storage 
1. (0.0,-0.2,0.0) 
C 5.0 o.o 5.0 3.1 3.5 15.3 25.1 
2. (0.0,-0. 2, 1.0)
C 5.0 2.1 5.5 2.4 3.4 11.9 25.1 
d 5.0 o.o 5.0 3.0 3.5 17.9 27.33. (6.0,-0.2,0.0) 
26.74. (6.0 ,-0. 2,1.0)
d 5.0 2.2 5.5 2.3 3.5 13.8 
1.7 9 .. 2 10.95. (6.0,-0.5,0.0) 5.0 o.o 5.0 3.9 
6. (6.0,-0.5,1.0) 5.0 1.2 5.2 3.5 2.1 8.3 10. 7 
Footnotes: a. The sample consists of a string of 10,004 periods, with the first four 
discarded. The same sequence of random disturbances was used for each case. 
b. The symbols (C, n, D n)S denote the measure of demand curvature 
(= - q 
P" 
(q)/P' (q)), the elasticity of consumption demand, and the (one 
period lagged) elasticity of supply, respectively. Both elasticities 
are measured at the point (100, 100). 
c. Linear demand curve. 
d. Constant elasticity demand curve. 
T2 
TABLE 2 
DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF STORAGE AND IDEAL STABILIZATION 
DIFFERENCE FROM SITUATION WITHOUT STORAGE 
(Percent of expected annual revenue without storage)a 
Land Values: Present Value of Consumer Suq~lus:Case D Stora~~ Ideal Stabilization Stora~e Ideal Stabilization(C, n , n S)b Mean Mean 
1. (O.O, -0.2, O.O)c 12.2 24.7 -7.1 -12.4 
2.~Q.O, -0.2, 1.0)c 2.2 4.1 4.2 8.6 
3. (1.95,-0.2, 0.0) -3.1 0.6 7.9 11.7 
4.(1.95,-0.2,. 1.0). -.6 0.1 6.6 12.2 
5.(6.0, -0.2, O.O)d -33.6 -49.1 38.0 61.4 
6.(6.0, -0.2, 1.0)d -5.8 -8.3 11.6 20.6 
7.(6.0, -o.s, o.o) -8.0 -19.9 8.7 24.9 
8.(6.0, -o.s, 1.0) -3.4 -6.6 4.3 11.6 
Footnotes: a. The sample consists of a string of 10,004 periods, with the first four
discarded. The same sequence of random disturbances was used for each case.D S ·b. The symbols (C, n , n) denote 
• 
the measure of demand curvature 
(= -qP" (q)/P'(q)), the elasticity of consumption demand, and the (one
period lagged) elasticity of supply, respectively. Both elasticities
are measured at the point (100,100). 
c. Linear demand curve. 
d. Constant elasticity demand curve. 
Nl 
FOOTNOTES 
1. The presence of additional individual disturbances uncorrelated 
with aggregate production would not alter the results of this paper. 
2. If we had included the accessibility value as a decreasing function 
of S,the storage rules derived below would have been bent upwards at the 
left, to indicate higher levels of storage at low levels of availability. 
3. The following conditions (Samuelson 1971), 
-T
Lim (l+r)-T ST = Lim(l+r) EPt = 0, 
T ➔ Cl) T ➔ Cl) 
rule out long-run speculative explosion of storage and expected price. 
4. If the net cost of storage included a sufficiently high premium 
occur.for accessibility at low levels of S, then some storage would always 
However, results obtained under such a specification confirm that such 
essential "working stocks", being relatively small and unresponsive to 
economic incentives, do not greatly alter the general inferences discussed 
below because they play only a minor role in smoothing production. 
5. Qualitatively similar storage functions were derived in the 
pioneering study of Gustafson (1958a). A linear storage rule is derived 
analytically in a starkly simplified model in Aiyagari, Eckstein, and 
Eichenbaurn (1980). 
6. An exception is Gardner (1979) who allows for responsive supply 
in a model with integer storage and additive disturbances in production. 
D S 
7. For example, in the case where C = 1.95, n = -0.2, n = 1, 
(not reported in Table 1) mean planned production is less under storage. 
However, if the market is completely stabilized (i.e., if v is fixed at 
zero), planned production is slightly higher than in a stochastic market 
N2 
without storage. 
8. These studies, like this paper, take a comparative statics 
approach. They do not consider the welfare implications of the initial 
buildup of stocks upon the introduction of storage. Such dynamic effects 
are considered in Wright and Williams (1981). 
9. Assuming an individualistic social welfare function, the 
change in the area under the rmcompensated consumption demand curve is 
an exact measure of the change in welfare, only if the marginal utility 
of income is constant over the relevant range of price. This is true 
if R = n 
y 
over the range of prices considered where R is the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion with respect to income, and n 
y 
is the income 
elasticity of demand. This condition is fulfilled if, for example, R is 
constant and the indirect utility function has the additively separable 
form in each time period: 
V = A(P) + F(Y) 
where F(Y) is linear in in (Y) (in which case R = n 
y 
= 1) or in Y 
y
(risk neutral, n = O). More generally, the error involved in using 
the Harshallian demand curve is small if the commodity in question has 
a low share of the consumer budget or a low income elasticity of 
demand (Willig (1976)). Under these conditions, the measure of relative 
commodity risk aversion, C, is at least approximately independent of R. 
For producers and starers, we have assumed either that R = 0 or that they 
behave in a risk-neutral fashion because they have access to a competitive 
capital market,and because the coefficient of variation of the land price is 
N3 
very small. (The coefficient of variation of the land prices in the examples 
in Table 2 is always below .03, assuming the land share is at least 0.3). 
The relaxat-ion of the assumption of risk neutrality.with respect to income 
is an obvious topic for further research. The implications of risk 
averse behavior on the part of producers is investigated in an analytical 
model of price stabilization by Newbery and Stiglitz (1979). 
10. In the 10,000 sample observations for the set of cases con­
sidered, planned production ranged from 2% above to about 8% below the 
equilibrium output under ideal stabilization. Since nonlinearities in 
supply outside this range would have virtually no effect on the derivation 
of the storage rule or on the calculation of changes in land value, we 
have chosen a yardstick that does not impose an unnecessary restriction on 
the supply function outside the relevant range. 
11. Further simulations (not reported here) show that the effect 
of storage on land value has a nonlinear relation to nD and n 
5• This 
can be shown analytically for ideal stabilization. From Wright (1979, p. 1025, 
equation 36) the annual expected gain in producer surplus relative to P q 
is approximated by 
where lnD I is the absolute value of n. D 
Thus 
2. C 





The numerical results for storage are qualitatively similar. They 
s 
show that marginal increases in ln°1 or n moderate the positive or negative 
effects of storage on producer surplus, the effect decreasing as the absolute 
value of t~e elasticity in question increases. 
12. This can be shown using a simplified analytical model of storage. 
8 
The easiest cases to consider are those for which n = O. Ignoring the 
non-negativity constraint on S, and assuming constant marginal propensitya 
- r 
to stores, 0 < s ~ 1, the rational producer incentive P becomes, using 
a second order approximation to the inverse demand function evaluated at 
mean consumption q, 
- 1 2 -2 2 
Pr (s) = E {(l + v)[P(q) + vq(l s)P' (q) + <2> V q (1 - s) P" (q)]5l 
For any particular marginal propensity to store s the difference 








s 2 • 




The effect of a marginal increase in storage is given by 
2 
-aac(s) V 
= [ C (s - 1) + 1]
D as n 
·Thus when there is no storage (s =O), the introduction of a small amount 
of storage reduces producer surplus (and, since the net benefits are positive, 
must favor consumers) if C >l, Producers always gain from marginal storage 
in the neighborhood of s = 1. 
Bl 
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